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ORCHESTRATING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: THE
ORGANIZATION OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AT
THE UNITED NATIONS
PHILIP A. SANDICK*
The United Nations was created not to lead mankind to
heaven, but to save humanity from hell.†
–Dag Hammarskjöld, Former United Nations Secretary-General
The future will see not the renovation or the construction of
a glistening new international [governance] architecture
but rather the continued spread of an unattractive but adaptable multilateral sprawl that delivers a partial measure of
international cooperation through a welter of informal
arrangements and piecemeal approaches.††
–Stewart Patrick, Director of the International Institutions and
Global Governance Program at the Council on Foreign Relations,
The Unruled World: The Case for Good Enough Global Governance,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 58 (Jan./Feb. 2014)
INTRODUCTION
We are in a state of crisis. Humanity is now considered the “dominant driver of change to the Earth System,”1 threatening “major destabilization of the very ecosystems that sustain human life and well-being.”2
In a major report issued March 31, 2014, by the IntergovernmentalPanel
*
J.D., Northwestern University School of Law (2014); LL.M., International Human
Rights, Northwestern University School of Law (2014).
†
Dag Hammarskjöld, Former Secretary-General, United Nations, Address to General
Assembly (1956).
††
Stewart Patrick, Director of the International Institutions and Global Governance
Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, The Unruled World: The Case for Good
Enough Global Governance, Foreign Affairs, 58 (Jan./Feb. 2014).
1
Johan Rockström et al., Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for
Humanity, 14 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 14(2), 32 (2009) (citations omitted).
2
Jeffrey Sachs, The Future of Development Goals, in COMMONWEALTH MINISTERS
REFERENCE BOOK 2012 53, 54 (2012), available at http://earth.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file
/Sachs%20Writing/2012/Commonwealth_Ministers_Book_SDGs.pdfmonwealth_Ministers
_Book_SDGs.pdf.
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on Climate Change, the “leading international body for the assessment of
climate change”3 stated that such change is occurring, but that the Earth’s
systems are so complex that it simply cannot know what the risks will be.4
Yet some people have already noted immediate risks. The Governor
of California recently drew “a direct link between climate change and
both the record-setting drought that has left the state parched and the
early season wildfires that broke out across California last week.”5
Similarly, the Governor of Washington explained that climate change “is
not a hypothetical thing for governors on the West Coast—this is fire
alarms and floods.”6 While the preeminent scientists say we cannot know
what exactly the effects of climate change will be, we do know about some
of the immediate effects, and they do not bode well for humankind’s future
harmony with nature.7 They don’t even bode well for humankind’s current
harmony with nature.
But proactive laws in West Coast states will not solve the West
Coast’s climate problems. Rather, climate change is an international problem that requires an international solution. Even with the knowledge that
action is required to mitigate the effects of climate change, we cannot seem
to overcome our collective action problem. Director of the Columbia University Earth Institute Jeffrey Sachs recently lamented that despite numerous
declarations, pacts, treaties, commissions, conferences, and summits since
the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, “the course
of our planet has not changed.”8
3

Organization, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), http://www.ipcc
.ch/organization/organization.shtml (last visited Nov. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma
.cc/5YCX-VVEP.
4
LISA V. ALEXANDER ET AL., IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 3, 4 (2013), available at http://www.climatechange
2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf.
5
Jennifer Medina, In California, Climate Issues Moved to Fore by Governor, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2014, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/politics/in
-california-climate-issues-moved-to-fore-by-governor.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma
.cc/8AXP-7NSE.
6
Id.
7
See Justin Gillis & Kenneth Chang, Scientists Warn of Rising Oceans From Polar Melt,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/science
/earth/collapse-of-parts-of-west-antarctica-ice-sheet-has-begun-scientists-say.html (“The
rise of the sea is likely to continue to be relatively slow for the rest of the 21st century . . . but
in the more distant future it may accelerate markedly, potentially throwing society into
crisis.”), archived at http://perma.cc/X73D-8HQJ.
8
Jeffrey Sachs, Keynote Speech at Session Five of the Open Working Group on Sustainable
Development Goals (OWG5) (Nov. 25, 2013).

2014]

ORCHESTRATING UNDER UNCERTAINTY

55

Thus, the state of crisis addressed by this Article has two facets:
one of nature and one of global governance. This Article focuses on the
second. It seeks to answer how best to design an organization to accomplish
the goal of sustainable development within the current situations of global
governance and environmental crisis.
In all but the most pseudoscientific corners,9 it is recognized that
we stand at the precipice. Even the popular financial media is saturated
with calls for environmental accountability,10 but global governance mechanisms thus far have been ineffective in this regard.11 If we cannot solve
the global governance crisis, we will not solve the natural crisis. And if
we do not solve the natural crisis very soon, we will hand over to the next
generation a planet in irreversible decline, a planet that may not be able
to sustain human life as we know it for much longer.12 As the Economist
put it: “A hundred years from now, looking back, the only question that will
appear important about the historical moment in which we now live is the
question of whether or not we did anything to arrest climate change.”13
The state of the planet is profoundly a human rights issue. To start,
every person has the right to a “social and international order” in which
her rights can be fully realized.14 And since 1986, people have the explicit
right to development.15 In 2000, the “largest gathering of world leaders
to date”16 drafted and adopted the United Nations (“UN”) Millennium
Declaration, which set measurable, time-bound development targets—
the famous Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”)—that were largely
9

See generally Climate Name Change, DENIERS & OBSTRUCTIONISTS, http://www.climate
namechange.org/#/deniers (last visited Nov. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5PAK
-DDUB.
10
See, e.g.,Climate Change: In the Balance, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 5, 2014), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21600080/print; Scott Cendrowski, Who Will Fix China’s
Pollution Mess?, SCOTTCENDROWSKI.COM (Apr. 28, 2014) (asserting that “business created
China’s problem. Now it needs to fix it.”), archived at http://perma.cc/SHV6-73N8.
11
MARIA IVANOVA, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: RETHINKING THE ENVIRONMENTAL PILLAR 13 (2011).
12
See generally Rockström, supra note 1.
13
Climate Change: Durban and Everything That Matters, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 12, 2011,
9:13 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/12/climate-change,
archived at http://perma.cc/SR9A-CAJ8.
14
A Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217
(III), at 28 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
15
Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4,
1986) [hereinafter Declaration on RTD].
16
John W. McArthur, Own the Goals: What the Millennium Development Goals Have
Accomplished, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 152, 154 (Mar./Apr. 2013).
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based upon human rights norms. Some of those include the rights to
education,17 food,18 water, and sanitation.19
The MDGs sunset in 2015, and progress has been uneven. On the
purely developmental side, the “proportion of people living in extreme
poverty has been halved at the global level”20 and has been reduced significantly in every region.21 At the same time, the maternal health goals
“require accelerated interventions and stronger political backing” in order
to meet their targets,22 and the targets related to women’s employment
and political participation are far off schedule.23
And then there is MDG 7, which addresses environmental sustainability. Despite the target of “revers[ing] the loss of environmental
resources,”24 deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions continue to
accelerate.25 Fish stocks remain overexploited.26 Simply put, global development practices have been both uneven and unsustainable, and progress
on climate change has gone almost nowhere.27
Thus, the real challenge is sustainable development. The successors to the MDGs will likely be called the SDGs—the Sustainable
17

See Millennium Development Goal 2, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/millennium
goals/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014) [hereinafter MDG], archived at http://perma.cc/9UMD
-CA9R; UDHR, supra note 14, at 26(1); International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.2200A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A (vol. 993) (Dec. 16,1966) at 13
[hereinafter ICESCR]; Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/25 (vol.1577) (Nov. 20, 1989) at 28 [hereinafter CRC].
18
See MDG 1, supra note 17; UDHR, supra note 14, at art. 25; ICESCR, supra note 17,
at art. 11.
19
See MDG 7, supra note 17; UDHR, supra note 14, at art. 25; International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, Dec. 19, 1966, U.N.T.S. 14668 [hereinafter ICCPR];
ICESCR, supra note 17, at 11; The Right to Water, Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No 15 of 2002; UNGA, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, U.N.T.S. vol. 1249,
p. 13, art. 14(2) [hereinafter CEDAW]; CRC, supra note 17, at art. 24(c); See generally
Human Rights Council Res. 7/22, Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and
Sanitation (Mar. 28, 2009).
20
UNITED NATIONS, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2013, 4 (2013) [hereinafter
2013 MDG REPORT].
21
UNITED NATIONS, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: 2013 PROGRESS CHART (2013)
[hereinafter 2013 MDG PROGRESS CHART].
22
2013 MDG REPORT, supra note 20, at 5; 2013 MDG PROGRESS CHART, supra note 21.
23
2013 MDG PROGRESS CHART, supra note 21.
24
Official List of MDG Indicators, MILLENNIUM DEV, GOALS INDICATORS, http://mdgs.un
.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/E2Q-H8PC.
25
2013 MDG REPORT, supra note 20, at 42–44.
26
Id. at 44.
27
Id. at 3.
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Development Goals. The Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (“OWG”) is currently in the process of crafting goals, targets,
and indicators28 that countries and other actors around the world can use
to galvanize a concerted effort to make development sustainable.29 There
have been thirteen OWG sessions. In this paper, sessions will be indicated
by “OWG [number of session].”
How to galvanize and organize that concerted effort is the $64,000
question. A UN body called the High-Level Political Forum (“HLPF”) is
slated to oversee and to “promote system-wide coherence and coordination
of sustainable development policies”30 throughout the myriad sustainable
development initiatives at the UN, including the SDGs. It is supposed to
do that through “agenda-setting.”31 Like the SDGs, the HLPF is in its formative stages; commentators believe States will make important decisions
about the HLPF’s organizational design in the next six months to two
years.32 The consensus among States and stakeholders involved in the
process is that organizational design features of the HLPF will be much
less malleable after that.33
28

A note on the differences between these three terms. Goals are overarching policy outcomes, e.g., “Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education.” See MILLENNIUM DEV. GOALS
INDICATORS, supra note 24. Targets are quantitative measures, e.g., “Target 2.A: Ensure
that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full
course of primary schooling.” See id. Indicators specify exactly what measurements must be
taken in order to make those quantitative measures accurate and precise, e.g., Indicator 2.1:
“Net enrollment ratio in primary education”; Indicator 2.2: “Proportion of pupils starting
grade 1 who reach last grade of primary”; Indicator 2.3: “Literacy rate of 15–24 year-olds,
women and men.” See id.
29
2013 MDG REPORT, supra note 20, at 42.
30
G.A. Res. 67/290, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/290 (Aug. 23, 2013).
31
Concept Note for the Expert Group Meeting on Agenda-Setting for the High-Level
Political Forum on Sustainable Development, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON SUSTAINABLE
DEV. (Apr. 2014), http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/3642Concept
%20note%20for%20EGM%20on%20HLPF.pdf (“Among the functions contemplated for
the HLPF, the most important is that of agenda-setting. The resolution stipulates that the
forum will be a dynamic platform for regular dialogue and agenda-setting to advance sustainable development. It also mandates the forum to provide political leadership, guidance
and recommendations for sustainable development, follow up and review progress in the
implementation of sustainable development commitments, enhance the integration of the
three dimensions of sustainable development in a holistic and cross-sectoral manner at
all levels and have a focused, dynamic and action-oriented agenda, ensuring the appropriate
consideration of new and emerging sustainable development challenges.”).
32
See, e.g., Jan Gustav Stradeanas, Presentation on Modalities of Participation in the
HLPF at OWG8 (Apr. 30, 2014).
33
Steven Bernstein, The Role and Place of the High-Level Political Forum in Strengthening
the Global Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development, Sustainable Dev. 4
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Promoting system-wide coherence of all sustainable development
initiatives at the UN is a massive mandate. That is especially true in an
era of “global governance in pieces,”34 when governments—including the
most powerful—“recognize the futility of negotiating comprehensive international agreements among 193 UN member states, in the full glare of the
media and alongside tens of thousands of activists, interest groups, and
hangers-on.”35 Since governments now disaggregate issues into manageable
chunks and coordinate with specific players on specific items, the HLPF
will have its work cut out for it. And not to forget, this is all occurring in
a state of natural crisis.
Designing the HLPF to be nimble and flexible is a good first step,
because organizational design is a key factor in organizational functionality. That is particularly true both in international organizations (“IOs”)
and in crisis situations. This Article draws insights from the sociology of
organizations literature, the IO literature, and the organizational crisis
literature. In doing so, it blends aspects of each in a novel way in order
to find a novel solution to the fledgling HLPF’s operational challenges.
The novel solution is that the HLPF should be “heterarchical.”
Heterarchies are minimal-hierarchy organizations made up of people who
have different conceptions of what is valuable.36 Put another way, heterarchies “recognize that it is legitimate to articulate alternative conceptions of what is valuable, what is worthy, what counts.”37 And since
different evaluations are recognized as legitimate, the organization has
a constant baseline of “resourceful dissonance” or “creative friction.”38
Creative friction is important in crisis situations. That is so because
crisis situations are those in which the future is uncertain. An “uncertain”
future is one in which what is valuable for organizational success now
will not necessarily be valuable for getting through the crisis or for sustaining existence after the crisis.39 Heterarchies are best suited for crisis
situations because creative friction, a source of ongoing vitality, allows
(Sept. 2013), available at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2331
Bernstein%20study%20on%20HLPF.pdf.
34
Stewart Patrick, The Unruled World: The Case for Good Enough Global Governance,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1, 2 (Jan./Feb. 2014), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles
/140343/stewart-patrick/the-unruled-world, archived at http://perma.cc/6GT7-GNGJ.
35
Id.
36
DAVID STARK, THE SENSE OF DISSONANCE: ACCOUNTS OF WORTH IN ECONOMIC LIFE 5–6
(2009).
37
Id. at 5.
38
Id. at 5–6, 18.
39
Id. at 6.
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an organization to more easily recognize and respond to changes in what
is valuable for organizational success.40
Creative friction also makes heterarchies highly functional “Orchestrators.”41 “Orchestration” is a soft governance mode42 in which “one actor
(or set of actors), the Orchestrator, works through a second actor (or set
of actors), the Intermediary, to govern a third actor (or set of actors), the
Target.”43 If the HLPF is the sustainable development Orchestrator, the
Targets are those, such as States and multinational corporations, who
have the ability to directly affect sustainable development processes.44
Intermediaries could be many different types of entities, from NGOs to
business associations to other intergovernmental organizations.45
In a crisis, what is valuable for an Intermediary’s success changes,
so an Orchestrator must be able to recognize that change and continue
to support the Intermediary with newly necessary resources. Heterarchies are good at recognizing change and adapting to it because creative friction increases the likelihood that someone in the organization
will recognize the change and be able to adapt to it, and minimal hierarchy means that that person will be able to make his or her case to the
rest of the organization.46
But organizing the HLPF as a heterarchy may not be enough to
solve the sustainability problem. One reason is that the HLPF may simply
not have enough power to take the sort of action that might be required
to mitigate environmental degradation.47 Another reason is that some of
those involved in negotiations at the UN have vested interests in the
system continuing to work as it always has. Though climate change may
not be averted, at least their jobs would be secure.
International human rights bodies and mechanisms provide fertile
ground for analyzing the successes and failures of previous orchestration
efforts, as well as the successes and failures of the MDGs. Because
40

See id. at 5–6.
See Kenneth W. Abbott, et al., Orchestration: Global Governance Through Intermediaries
3, http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/cornell-ILIR/upload/Orchestration-for-Cornell-3-14.pdf
(last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
42
Id. at 4. Used here in the “soft” law sense, as opposed to the “hard” law of legally binding
instruments. See id. at 3, 8.
43
Id. at 3.
44
See id. at 2–3, 5.
45
See id. at 5, 14.
46
See STARK, supra note 36, at 5–6.
47
World Comm. On Env’t and Dev., Report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development: Our Common Future, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987).
41
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“human rights and sustainable development objectives are closely linked
and mutually reinforcing,”48 this Article garners significant support for
its arguments from the human rights literature. Lessons are drawn from
the OHCHR’s orchestration efforts, as well as the accountability mechanisms built into human rights treaty bodies. For example, the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has adjudicated the right to
development within the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
In addition, International Human Rights (“IHR”) norms provide the lens
through which policy gaps in the MDGs can be seen with clarity.
This Article has three parts. First, this introduction has identified
the two central problems: there is a global environmental crisis threatening our planet and its life, and efforts to mitigate or reverse environmental decline have not worked. Part I gives a brief overview of State
cooperation in general and key historical instances of sustainable development cooperation at the UN. Part II proposes an organizational
structure for the HLPF based upon the heterarchy and orchestration
frameworks outlined above. Part III suggests an alternative arrangement, given HLPF insufficiencies that are already apparent. Finally, the
Conclusion offers recommendations.
In addition to the multiple literatures mentioned above, this
Article also draws insights from fieldwork at UN Headquarters at the
end of 2013 and beginning of 2014. I observed, participated, and conducted interviews during the sixth, seventh, and eighth sessions of
the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (“OWG”),
took part in numerous preparatory meetings, and served on multiple
steering committees. Substantial access provided numerous occasions for
me to observe and reflect on the UN processes that currently coexist
in the sustainable development sphere.49 Those observations and reflections provide the foundation for an original contribution to the conversation, and I am greatly indebted to those who facilitated my access
and experiences.

48

TST Issues Brief: Human Rights Including the Right to Development, SUSTAINABLE
DEV., http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2391TST%20Human%20
Rights%20Issues%20Brief_FINAL.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
49
The author does not subscribe to any particular sociological perspective, such as
participant observation, ethnography, or grounded theory, but rather uses a blended
approach. It is beyond the scope of this project to analyze which approach would be most
effective in this setting. See generally James Fernandez & Michael Herzfeld, In Search
of Meaningful Methods, in HANDBOOK OF METHODS IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (H.
Russell Bernard, ed., 1998).
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STATE COOPERATION ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The history of sustainable development initiatives and cooperation at the UN is long and robust: it starts with the beginning of the UN
and there is no end in sight. This section describes some of the pertinent
history and draws lessons from organizational successes and failures.
A.

State Cooperation in General

States cooperate to solve transnational problems, and often create
organizations to facilitate continued cooperation.50 Political scientists will
explain that all international cooperation occurs “under anarchy.”51 That
is, even with the existence of global governance bodies like the UN, sovereignty still lies with States that cannot be coerced into action.52 Thus, a
State’s decision to establish, design, and participate in an intergovernmental organization, at least under anarchy, cannot be coerced.
That having been written, States regularly enter into treaties and
other international agreements that partially abrogate their sovereignty.
States also regularly cooperate in the creation of international institutions.
The growth of international institutions is accelerating as the world
becomes more and more interconnected, since more interconnectedness
means more international issues that require international solutions, and
multilateral institutions “make [international] cooperation easier.”53 One
of the main reasons cooperation is easier in an institution is that institutions lower the transaction costs of cooperation by “enabl[ing] states to
share responsibilities and burdens.”54
In fact, States have a legal duty to cooperate on development issues.
This “duty of international cooperation”55 arises primarily from Articles 55
50

This view is somewhat contested in IR literature, for example by some realists who
argue that IOs are little more than tools of powerful States to impose their will with slightly
greater legitimacy. However, whether States create organizations in order to impose their
will or in order to facilitate pure cooperation, States nonetheless often create international
organizations in order to do so. See Alexander Thompson, Coercion Through IOs: The
Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission, 60 INT’L ORG. 1, 1–3 (2006).
51
See Robert Axelrod & Robert O. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy:
Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POLITICS 226, 226 (Oct. 1985).
52
See UN Charter, art. 2, para. 1.
53
Robert H. Keohane, Hegemony and After: Knowns and Unknowns in the Debate Over
Decline, 91 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 114, 117 (July/Aug. 2012).
54
Id.
55
See generally Khurshid Iqbal, The Declaration on the Right to Development and Implementation, 1 POL. PERSP. GRADUATE J. 1, 1 (2007) (arguing that the duty to cooperate is
“the main principle” that lends the right to development legal force); Roland Y. Rich, The
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and 56 of the UN Charter, in which “[a]ll Members pledge themselves to
take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the
achievement of”56 the following “conditions of stability and well-being:”57
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and
related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion.58
Specifics of the duty to cooperate arising out of Articles 55 and 56
have been clarified in subsequent UN resolutions, including the 1970
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States,59 the 1975 Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States,60 and, of course, the 1986 Declaration on the
Right to Development.61
In addition to the duty to cooperate on development issues, many
States also already have the legal duty to respect, protect, and promote
many of the substantive aspects of development.62 A variety of UN-sponsored human rights treaties address these issue, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (“CRC”).63
Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 287, 291 (1983)
(arguing that the duty to cooperate is “the fundamental source of the right to development”);
Noel G. Villaroman, The Right to Development: Exploring the Legal Basis of a Supernorm,
22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 299, 319–23 (Aug. 2010).
56
U.N. Charter, art. 56.
57
Id. at art. 55.
58
Id.
59
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970).
60
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281
(Dec. 12, 1974).
61
Declaration on RTD, supra note 15.
62
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 19.
63
ICCPR, supra note 19; ICESCR, supra note 17; Convention on the Elimination of All
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Of course, not all States have signed and ratified or acceded to
these treaties, and many States have reservations to various treaty
provisions.64 But even when States agree to cooperate, the agreements
they sign and the institutions they create vary in effectiveness and enforcement capabilities.65 The rest of this section details the history of
sustainable development cooperation within the UN.
B.

Pre-Rio Cooperation on Sustainable Development

The Brundtland Commission’s 1987 report, Our Common Future,
is the most commonly cited source of the definition of sustainable development, but the seeds of the concept were sewn much earlier. Sustainable
development was an outgrowth of economic development. The text of the
1945 UN Charter pays particular attention to economic development in
Chapters IX and X.66 The 1960s was the first United Nations Decade of
Development,67 the 1970s was the Second UN Development Decade,68 and
the 1980s was the Third UN Development Decade.69
It was in the Second Development Decade that sustainability—
that is, the environment—entered the picture. The 1972 Stockholm
Conference’s outcome document contained multiple provisions emphasizing that economic development initiatives must be compatible with
environmental preservation and protection.70 From 1972 on, the environment became an important feature of any discussion at the UN about
economic development.71
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; CEDAW, supra note 19;
CRC, supra note 17.
64
See ICCPR, supra note 19.
65
See infra Part I.C.1.
66
U.N. Charter, art. 55–72.
67
RICHARD JOLLY ET AL., THE POWER OF UN IDEAS 8 (2005).
68
See International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development
Decade, G.A. Res. 2626, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2626 (Oct. 24, 1970).
69
See International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development
Decade, G.A. Res. 35/56, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/56 (Dec. 5, 1980).
70
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stokholm, June 5–16, 1972,
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973). (“Principle 11. The environmental policies of all States should
enhance and not adversely affect the present or future development potential of developing
countries, nor should they hamper the attainment of better living conditions for all.”).
71
See FELIX DODDS ET AL., FROM RIO+20 TO A NEW DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: BUILDING A
BRIDGE TO A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 5 (2014) (calling Stockholm “the precursor to the
international agenda of sustainable development”).
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In contrast, there was little discussion of the environment prior to
1972. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) only
hints at environmental concerns.72 Instead, the UDHR focuses on the rights
of individuals (the inclusion of a right to development within the UDHR
was discussed and scrapped during the drafting process).73 Likewise, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) does not
mention the environment, and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) only notes that the environment
plays a role in the right to health.74
After the conclusion in 1982 of the ten-year review of the UN Environmental Programme—another outgrowth of the Stockholm Conference—
then-UN Secretary-General (“UNSG”) Javier Pérez de Cuéllar asked the
Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland, to establish a World
Commission on Environment and Development.75 The UNGA formally endorsed the initiative at the end of 1983,76 and the Brundtland Commission
issued its final report in 1987.77 That report, Our Common Future, defined
sustainable development as “a balanced integration of social development,
economic development, and environmental protection that meets the needs
of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”78
C.

The Right to Development

Before the Brundtland Commission issued its report, the right to
development (“RTD”) had already come into existence. First, in 1981, RTD
was enshrined within the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights

72

UDHR, supra note 14, at art. 28 (“Everyone is entitled to a social and international order
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”).
73
See id.
74
See ICCPR, supra note 19; ICESCR, supra note 17, at art. 12(2)(b) (“The steps to be taken
by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of [the right
to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health] shall include those
necessary for [t]he improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene.”).
75
DODDS ET AL., supra note 71, at 5.
76
Process of Preparation of the Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond,
G.A. Res. 38/161, U.N. Doc. 38/161 (Dec. 19, 1983).
77
World Comm’n on Env’t and Dev., Rep. of the World Comm’n on Environment and
Development: Our Common Future, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987) [hereinafter Our
Common Future].
78
DODDS ET AL., supra note 71, at 5.
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(“Banjul Charter”).79 Second, in 1986, the UNGA adopted its Declaration
on the Right to Development (“Declaration on RTD”).80
1.

Banjul Charter Right to Development

Article 22 of the Banjul Charter establishes the collective RTD of
“peoples” within all ratifying African States.81 That article reads:
1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social
and cultural development with due regard to their freedom
and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common
heritage of mankind.
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively,
to ensure the exercise of the right to development.82
The phrasing of RTD as a collective right by referring to “all
peoples” instead of “all people” is in line with the established history of
the right. That is, “after the wave of decolonization in the 1960s, the right
to development [was first articulated as] a demand by developing countries
against developed ones to bring to an end the perpetuation of, whether
perceived or real, colonialist policies of economic domination and exploitation.”83 In other words, RTD was a direct product of what some
continue to refer to as the “North-South Divide,” but this paper will refer
to as the Developed/Developing Divide (“D/D Divide”).84
It is also worth noting that drafters incorporated into Article 22
the “common heritage of mankind” (“CHM”) theory. While a single definition of CHM remains elusive,85 it generally holds that certain realms fall
79

African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21
I.L.M. 58 (1982), art. 22, available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ [hereinafter
Banjul Charter], archived at http://perma.cc/S4QR-59PP.
80
Declaration on RTD, supra note 15.
81
Banjul Charter, supra note 79; State Reporting, AFR. COMM’N ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’
RIGHTS, http://www.achpr.org/states/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma
.cc/Q9BB-LPB6.
82
Banjul Charter, supra note 79.
83
Villaroman, supra note 55, at 300.
84
For discussion of the term’s obsolescence, see Jean-Philippe Therien, Beyond the
North–South Divide: The Two Tales of World Poverty, 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 723–42 (1999).
Those critiques notwithstanding, this paper continues to use the standard phraseology.
85
See, e.g., Jennifer Frakes, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the Deep
Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach A
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outside of the jurisdiction of any particular sovereign state and should be
held in trust for future generations.86 Those realms are typically thought
to be the Arctic, Antarctic, deep seabed, and outer space,87 but Article 22
obviously references more accessible resources, too.88
The first and only time that Article 22 RTD was tested, the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACHPR” or “African
Commission”) upheld the right, found a violation, and ordered equitable
and monetary relief.89 In Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya)
and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare
Council v. Kenya, a community of 60,000 Endorois alleged that the government of Kenya forcibly removed the Endorois from three of their
ancestral lands without prior consultation or adequate compensation.90
The government did so in order to establish the Lake Hannington (later,
Lake Bogoria) Game Reserve.91 The Endorois sought restitution of their
land, “with legal title and clear demarcation,” as well as “compensation
to the community for . . . the loss . . . of their property, development and
natural resources, [and] . . . freedom to practice their religion,”92 since the
latter was linked to their particular ancestral land.
The Article 22 violation alleged and confirmed was that Kenya,
by virtue of removing the Endorois, had failed “to adequately involve the
Endorois in the development process and . . . to ensure the continued
improvement of the Endorois community’s well-being.”93 The “set of choices
and capabilities open to” the Endorois shrank after their eviction, and
their cattle died in large numbers after the Endorois were refused “access
to the Lake, the salt licks and their usual pasture.”94
The Endorois argued that the “realisation of the right to development . . . requires the improvement and increase in capacities and
Compromise?, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 409, 409 (2003) (“The common heritage of mankind
principle (“common heritage principle”) is not clearly defined.”).
86
Id. at 413.
87
See Scott J. Shackelford, The Tragedy of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 28 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 109, 110 (Feb. 2009).
88
Banjul Charter, supra note 79.
89
Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, Afr. Comm’n on Hum. & Peoples’
Rts., Communication No. 276/2003 (Feb. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Endorois v. Kenya].
90
Id. at ¶¶ 2–3.
91
Id. at ¶ 177.
92
Id. at ¶ 22.
93
Id. at ¶ 125.
94
Id. at ¶ 126.
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choices” available to a people.95 As such, they should have increased control over the use of their natural resources—as opposed to having them
taken away without consultation or compensation and turned into a
game reserve.96
The ACHPR agreed. It held that the Article 22 RTD:
is a two-pronged test, that it is both constitutive and instrumental, or useful as both a means and an end. A violation
of either the procedural or substantive element constitutes
a violation of the right to development. Fulfilling only one of
the two prongs will not satisfy the right to development. The
African Commission notes the Complainants’ arguments
that recognising the right to development requires fulfilling
five main criteria: it must be equitable, non-discriminatory,
participatory, accountable, and transparent, with equity
and choice as important, over-arching themes in the right
to development.97
Thus, because Kenya did not create a process by which the development of the game reserve “increased the capabilities of the Endorois,”
but actively decreased their capabilities, inter alia, to decide where to
live, Kenya violated the Endorois’s Article 22 RTD.98
The ACHPR noted other duties that may be triggered by RTD.
First, a government must consult with indigenous peoples “especially
when dealing with sensitive issues as land.”99 Failing to adequately consult could well lead to a failure to give the people their due influence in the
process by which they are developed.100 Greater evidence may be required
to demonstrate adequacy where the indigenous peoples are in an “unequal
bargaining position,” such as being illiterate and/or possessing a different
understanding of property use and ownership.101 In those situations, the
State must conduct the consultation in such a way that allows the indigenous peoples to be fully informed and to participate meaningfully.102
Kenya lost on all of these grounds.
95

Endorois v. Kenya, at ¶ 126.
Id.
97
Id. at ¶ 277.
98
Id. at ¶ 279.
99
Id. at ¶ 281.
100
Id.
101
Endorois v. Kenya, at ¶ 282.
102
Id.
96

68

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 39:53

Though a violation of RTD was found and Kenya was ordered to
return land to the Endorois and pay them due compensation for their
suffering, implementation of the decision has not been forthcoming. Two
years after the African Commission’s 2010 ruling, the Kenyan government was still “drag[ging] its feet” to implement the order.103 Four years
later, in February 2014, the Kenyan government actively contravened
the ACHPR’s decision by parceling out Endorois land to non-Endorois.104
Kenya was able to take or fail to take action because the Banjul
Charter’s “enforcement powers are limited to only making recommendations to the Assembly of Heads of States and Government.”105 While
some African States demonstrated their desire for a more robust enforcement mechanism from the very signing of the Charter,106 no such mechanism was included. As a result, “all Heads of State of the OAU [would]
together tackle the problems of administering or enforcing the Charter.”107
Endorois v. Kenya is a good demonstration of how anarchy affects
cooperation. Kenya signed and ratified the Banjul Charter, but when it did
not want to abide by a verdict against it, it simply ignored the ACHPR’s
decision.108 Other States who shared responsibility for enforcing Charter
obligations did not take adverse action against Kenya, for whatever
reason. Perhaps because many of those other States, like Kenya, are also
in violation of the Banjul Charter Article 62 requirement that they

103

Two Years on from African Commission’s Ruling, Kenya Continues to Drag its Feet in
Recognizing Indigenous Peoples’ Ownership of Wildlife Park, MRG Urges Government to
Act, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INT’L (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.minorityrights.org/11191
/press-releases/two-years-on-from-african-commissions-ruling-kenya-continues-to-drag
-its-feet-in-recognising-indigenous-peoples-ownership-of-wildlife-park-mrg-urges
-government-to-act.html [hereinafter Two Years], archived at http://perma.cc/6HE7-AL53.
104
Rights Group Urges Kenyan Government to Stop Parcelling Endorois Community Land
Without Consultation, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INT’L (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www
.minorityrights.org/12258/press-releases/rights-group-urges-kenyan-government-to-stop
-parcelling-endorois-community-land-without-consultation.html, archived at http://perma
.cc/FW2Z-ZLTH.
105
Circle of Rights: Module 28: The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
and ESC Rights, UNIVERSITY OF MINN. HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR, http://www1.umn.edu
/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/circle/modules/module28.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/9S3H-HGBZ.
106
See, e.g., Banjul Charter, supra note 79 (“While acceding to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights it is the view of the Republic of South Africa that there
should be consultation between States parties to the Charter, inter alia, to: consider
possible measures to strengthen the enforcement mechanisms of the Charter.”).
107
Id.
108
Two Years, supra note 103.
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submit implementation reports every two years. A map of State compliance with Article 62 reporting obligations demonstrates said widespread dereliction109:

The key lesson learned from Endorois is that a development obligation within a regional cooperation agreement—without at least some
enforcement power—does not guarantee results.

109

State Reporting, supra note 81.
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UN Declaration on the Right to Development

The UN Declaration on RTD110 was more robust than the African
version but had no implementing mechanism and no adjudicatory
mechanism. In the legal sense, it was, like other UN General Assembly
Declarations, non-binding.111 It was also, like the Banjul Charter RTD,
indicative of the D/D Divide. The United States was the only UN Member
State to oppose the declaration; eight others abstained.112
The declaration did have some normative impact, however. RTD
as codified in the declaration became an integral part of future conversations about development.113 For example, the 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights reaffirmed RTD as depicted in the Declaration on RTD and
established that it is “a universal and inalienable right and an integral
part of fundamental human rights.”114 And, at the 2000 UN Millennium
Summit, discussed in further detail below, Member States passed a
Declaration that included a pledge “to making the right to development
a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human race from want.”115
D.

1992—Rio

Three years after the Declaration on RTD and two years after the
publication of Our Common Future, the UNGA held a Conference on
Environment and Development.116 It did so because it was, more than
twenty-four years ago, “[d]eeply concerned by . . . trends that, if allowed to
continue, could disrupt the global ecological balance, jeopardize the lifesustaining qualities of the Earth and lead to an ecological catastrophe.”117
Renamed “the Earth Summit,” the 1992 Rio Conference (“Rio”) had seven
110

Declaration on RTD, supra note 15.
Gregory J. Kerwin, The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in
Determining Principles of International Law in United States Courts, 1983 DUKE L.J. 876
(Sept. 1983).
112
Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality, 17
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137, 138 (2004).
113
Id.
114
World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter the
Vienna Conference].
115
Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res 55/2, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000).
116
UN Conference on Environment and Development (1992), UNITED NATIONS BRIEFING
PAPERS, http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/VSU7-9XA3.
117
G.A. Res 22/28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/228 (Dec. 22, 1989).
111
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significant outcomes: 1) the Convention on Biological Diversity;118 2) the
Desertification Convention;119 3) the Forest Principles;120 4) the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”); 5) the Rio Principles;
6) Agenda 21; and 7) the CSD.121
The Conventions on Desertification and Biodiversity,122 the
UNFCCC, and the Forest Principles have had negligible impact on their
respective areas.123 As delegates were preparing to gather in Rio de Janeiro
for Rio+20 in 2012, Nature published a “Rio Report Card”—and gave
each of the three Rio treaties an “F” on its respective main assignment.124
As of June 2012, the “overall growth rate of carbon emissions ha[d]n’t
changed much since 1970,”125 “we continue[d] to lose biodiversity at an unprecedented rate,”126 and the Desertification Convention had “received
scant attention from governments” and was “the most underinvested of
all conventions.”127
Jeffrey Sachs commented at OWG5 that the SDGs were our “last
best hope for finding a way forward that turns a situation that is extremely
dangerous into one that can be enormously promising.”128 He continued:
International law has not been sufficient. Twenty years
after Rio, in which three well-drafted treaties were agreed
and ratified, the course of the planet has not changed. We
118

United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, June 17, 1994, 1954
U.N.T.S. 3.
120
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3–14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. III),
Annex III (Aug. 12, 1992).
121
Who We Are, UNITED NATIONS DIV. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. IN BRIEF, http://www.un.org
/esa/desa/aboutus/dsd.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/V8V6
-DR6N.
122
See Jeff Tollefson & Natasha Gilbert, Rio Report Card, 486 NATURE 20 (June 7, 2012)
(asserting that the Biodiversity Convention failed “because it did not set concrete and
focused targets, . . . provided no means to measure progress towards protecting wildlife
and ecosystems[,] . . . lacked a dedicated body” and was underfunded, and that the
Desertification Convention failed because it “received scant attention from governments”
and was “the most underinvested of all conventions.”).
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 21.
126
Id. at 22 (quotation omitted).
127
Id. at 23 (quotation omitted).
128
Sachs, supra note 8.
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need the public engagement, the imagination, the moral
sentiment of our young people, the energy of youth that
can look to these goals as a fundamental new direction.129
The key lesson learned from these three treaties is the international
counterpart to the Banjul Charter’s regional illustration: a development
obligation within an international cooperation agreement—without enforcement power—does not guarantee implementation.
1.

Rio Principles

The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development also established 27 Rio Principles.130 Among other things, the Rio Principles affirm
both the centrality of human beings in the development agenda131 and
poverty eradication as the top priority;132 note each country’s complete
sovereignty over its domestic natural resources;133 and establish the economic principles of “precautionary approach”134 and “polluter pays.”135
The Rio Principles also included the concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (“CBDR”).136 CBDR is an outgrowth of
CHM—“common heritage of mankind”—theory and stands for the proposition that those who made the environmental mess (the developed
world) should be the ones who clean it up.137 It is considered “a manifestation of general principles of equity in international law”138—and also
signifies representation of the developing world’s agenda in multilateral
agreements. The Rio Principles and particularly CBDR continue to be considered the necessary foundational principles of any UN sustainable development agenda.139 Going forward, CBDR in particular will be recognized
129

Id.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/26, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
131
Id. at Principle 1.
132
Id. at Principle 5.
133
Id. at Principle 2.
134
Id. at Principle 15.
135
Id. at Principle 16.
136
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, supra note 130, at
Principle 7.
137
Legal Brief: The Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities: Origins and
Scope, CTR. FOR INT’L SUSTAINABLE DEV. LAW 1 (Aug. 26, 2002), http://cisdl.org/public/docs
/news/brief_common.pdf.
138
Id.
139
JOHN DREXHAGE & DEBORAH MURPHY, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: FROM BRUNDTLAND
TO RIO 2012 8, 2010.
130
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by States and stakeholders alike as perhaps the only equitable way to
assign obligations to mitigate or reverse climate change and other environmental degradation.
2.

Agenda 21 and Major Groups

Agenda 21 was designed to be a sustainable development agenda for
the 21st Century.140 It is voluntary and non-binding.141 Organizationally,
it is perhaps the most important development to come out of Rio because
it recognized that expansive stakeholder participation would be critical
to the success of development initiatives.142 It then established a system
through which to channel that participation: Major Groups (“MGs”).143
Agenda 21 established nine144 “programme areas,” called “Major
Groups,” in which it sought “real social partnership in support of common
efforts for sustainable development.”145 The MG structure is used by multiple ECOSOC bodies related to development. These bodies allow various
levels of access and participation to MG affiliates to ensure that stakeholders are involved in relevant global development discussions. Continued
use of the MG structure was reaffirmed in the Rio+20 outcome document,
The Future We Want.146
140

See Promoting Sustainable Human Settlement Development, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1
(Vol.I), ¶1.3 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21] (“Agenda 21 addresses the pressing problems
of today and also aims at preparing the world for the challenges of the next century.”).
141
FAQ: ICLEI, the United Nations, and Agenda 21, ICLEI—LOCAL GOV’TS FOR
SUSTAINABILITY, http://www.icleiusa.org/about-iclei/faqs/faq-iclei-the-united-nations-and
-agenda-21 (last visited Nov. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/YDD5-ZQFF.
142
See Agenda 21, supra note 140, at ¶ 23.2.
143
See id. at ¶¶ 23.1–23.2 (1992) (“Critical to the effective implementation of the objectives, policies and mechanisms agreed to by Governments in all programme areas of
Agenda 21 will be the commitment and genuine involvement of all social groups. One of the
fundamental prerequisites for the achievement of sustainable development is broad public
participation in decision-making.”).
144
The nine areas are Women, Children and Youth, Indigenous Peoples, Non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”), Local Authorities, Workers and Trade Unions, Business and
Industry, the Scientific and Technological Community, and Farmers. See id. at ch. 24–32.
145
Id. at ¶ 23.4.
146
The Future We Want, G.A. Res. A/RES/66/288 ¶ 43 (July 27, 2012) (“We underscore
that broad public participation and access to information and judicial and administrative
proceedings are essential to the promotion of sustainable development. Sustainable
development requires the meaningful involvement and active participation of regional,
national and subnational legislatures and judiciaries, and all major groups.”) [hereinafter
TFWW].
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In order for an entity anywhere in the world to become affiliated
with an MG, the process can be as simple as sending an email or signing up
for a mailing list. In order for MG participation to be effectively channeled,
Organizing Partners (“OPs”) are selected to act as intermediaries between
official UN processes and MG affiliates.147 UN processes can require OPs
to meet certain criteria, including expert knowledge of UN procedure,148
but those criteria are not strictly enforced. And while the MGs are currently
self-governing, MG governance is undergoing standardization in order to
ensure the sufficient representation of the affiliates of all of the MGs.
According to a UNSG report on MGs, the system is largely considered a success.149 That is so because expanded stakeholder participation spurred thousands of development initiatives around the world.
And, crucially,
[n]umerous case studies conducted over the past decade
have demonstrated that when a broad range of stakeholder groups are actively involved in programme design,
implementation and monitoring and are accountable to
each other on decisions or activities they undertake, the
results are more sustained than would otherwise be the
case. Participation generates shared values, mutually reinforced commitments, and joint ownership, which, in turn,
effectively breaks the traditional pattern dividing stakeholders into “recipients” and “providers”.150
These successes notwithstanding, some logistical issues have arisen,
and I can personally attest to at least two of them. First, membership
requirements for the MGs are not obvious. Before applying to join any
MGs, I consulted with many individuals, including one of the OPs for the
NGO MG and the Major Groups Programme Coordinator at the UN
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (“DESA”) Division for Sustainable Development (“DSD”). No one could answer the question, “Which
Major Group or Groups can my organization, the Northwestern School
147

See Organizing Partners, UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE DEV. KNOWLEDGE PLATFORM,
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/orgpartners.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/D7MJ-EGLY.
148
Id.
149
See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Major Groups: Report of the Secretary General, ¶ 12,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.17/2001/PC/4 (Mar. 14, 2001).
150
Id. at ¶ 13.
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of Law Center for International Human Rights (“CIHR”) join?” Perhaps
since the goal of Agenda 21 is broad stakeholder participation, the one
consistent piece of advice I received was that I was not prohibited from
seeking CIHR affiliation with all relevant MGs.
So I did. That raised the second issue: the method for gaining MG
affiliation is also far from clear. I contacted the OPs listed on the UN’s
new Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform.151 Only one—the
NGO OP—responded, and he quickly added CIHR to the NGO MG list.
I then signed CIHR up for the MG on Children and Youth (“MGCY”)
Google-based mailing list through their website, and it was added.152 I
applied to the Women’s MG through their website, but heard nothing thereafter. As described below, CIHR was able to impact the OWG process
because it was affiliated with the NGO MG and the MGCY. I have since
met the OP for the Women’s MG, and she assured me that if she had received the request, she would have granted affiliation. But it leaves open
the question of what others do when they simply request through the
website and hear nothing back. Self-government has its benefits, but when
a stakeholder is unable to participate because governance fails, it may be
time for a centralized authority to step in.
The lessons learned from Agenda 21’s implementation are threefold.
First, broad stakeholder participation benefits development initiatives.
Second, self-governance is sufficient only up to a point—after which a
centralized authority must establish and enforce participation standards.
And third, even with thousands of these more “sustained” partnerships,
the state of the planet still has not changed.
3.

CSD

The final outcome of Rio to be addressed here that significantly
changed the sustainable development landscape was the creation of the
Commission on Sustainable Development (“CSD”). The CSD was the first
UN body on sustainable development and was intended to be the
151

See UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE DEV. KNOWLEDGE PLATFORM, http://sustainable
development.un.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/VY7R-KV33.
152
It deserves noting—and perhaps further research—that the Major Group on Children
and Youth (“MGCY”) maintains an extremely active mailing list and Facebook page.
Many MGCY members have long and significant conversations through the list, and they
effectively organize themselves before and during each OWG in order to ensure that
anyone on the list has access to someone in every meeting and that notes are distributed
to the entire MGCY afterward.

76

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 39:53

“cornerstone of the United Nations intergovernmental framework for sustainable development governance.”153 It was mandated to “ensure the
effective follow-up of [Rio], as well as to enhance international cooperation
[in integrating] environment and development issues.”154 As such, it was
the precursor to the HLPF and is the main foundation upon which the
HLPF is being built.155
In the early years, it appeared to be performing its duties relatively well.156 It kept sustainable development high on the global agenda157
and engaged MGs in innovative ways. One commentator called the CSD
“a veritable laboratory of new patterns of interaction [between the UN
and] civil society.”158
One of these innovative engagement methods was the “multistakeholder dialogues,” which were introduced in 1998. In these dialogues,
parliamentary procedure was suspended for two days of the CSD annual
session to allow MG representatives and government delegates to speak
informally.159 Noteworthy outcomes of the dialogues were reported in the
Chair’s Summary of the session, and there was evidence that the dialogues
had a considerable effect on decision making.160 For example, a 2003 report
prepared for the UNSG Panel of Eminent Persons on UN Relations with
Civil Society reported that “80% of the international work programme on
sustainable tourism development adopted by CSD in 1999 came from proposals made and discussed at the multi-stakeholder dialogue on tourism.”161
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U.N. Secretary-General, Lessons Learned from the Commission on Sustainable Development: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/67/757 (Feb. 26, 2013) [hereinafter
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High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE
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Interaction Between NGOs and Intergovernmental Organizations?, in NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 21, 35 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Luisa Vierucci eds., 2008).
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Notwithstanding these advances, the CSD had significant shortcomings. Guyana’s Sir Shridath “Sonny” Ramphal put the CSD in the context
of other UN commissions that dealt with global issues162: “The Brandt
Commission produced Cancún, and the Brundtland Commission produced
Rio. What did Rio produce? Rio produced the UN’s sustainable development
commission. What has that commission produced? Disappointment.”163
That disappointment stems from the fact that the CSD, over time,
lost legitimacy and effectiveness. It did so because it failed to attract ministers and high-level policymakers, particularly in the economic and social
sectors.164 They were not required to be there and they did not show up. The
CSD also adopted a multi-year agenda in 2002 that was too rigid to accommodate “addressing critical contemporary challenges and new and emerging issues.”165 This development is covered in the Rio+10 section below.
In addition, the CSD failed to fully integrate the three pillars of
sustainable development—economic, social, and environmental—into its
work. Specifically, the economic development pillar was left almost
entirely out. An independent review of the CSD attributed this failure to
the fact that the CSD’s “work did not include an examination of the
economic system or economic drivers, such as the role of multinational
corporations or trade in sustainable development.”166 Because the CSD
did not investigate that sector, it could not integrate that information
into a comprehensive analysis of sustainable development processes.
According to the UNSG report, the CSD inadequately monitored
and reviewed the progress of agreements related to sustainable development. Unlike the African Commission’s finger-pointing at States for not
submitting reports, the UNSG pointed his finger at the CSD for not
analyzing the reports that it received. “While 109 countries as of 2009
[had] developed sustainable development strategies,”167 and “data on the
strategies has been made available to Member states on an annual basis,
the Commission has never dedicated time to a systematic review.”168 The
U.N. NON-GOVERNMENTAL LIAISON SERV. (2003), available at http://www.un-ngls.org
/orf/ecosoc%20HL%20Panel%20-%20Background%20paper%20by %20Secretariat.doc.
162
Shridath Ramphal Biography, INT’L INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.iisd
.org/about/staffbio.aspx?id=385 (last visited Nov. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc
/WU55-4T4L.
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reason why is unclear, but an obvious answer is that it was not considered
within its mandate to do so.
Lastly, as if to signal the end of its life, the CSD failed to agree on
any policy outcome at all. This happened not once but twice.169 Ambassador John Ashe, as President of the UNGA, addressed the final meeting
of the CSD in 2013:
With the constantly evolving institutions and instruments
in the multilateral system, as with life in general, we must
expect change and do our utmost to adapt to and use those
changes to develop new organs and bodies in support of
the greater good. This applies to both the Commission on
Environment and Development and the CSD, as well as
others, but we should not mourn their loss, precisely because we can learn from their lessons and legacy.170
The lessons and legacy of the CSD teach us four things about the
HLPF: 1) that high-level ministers and heads of state must remain involved in the HLPF; 2) that the HLPF must remain flexible enough to
deal with new issues as they emerge; 3) that the HLPF must monitor all
pillars of and agreements on sustainable development; and 4) that stakeholder involvement with the HLPF will likely generate new and good ideas
for States to adopt. A possible fifth lesson is that it may be beneficial for
some official or body to be vested with the power to make a decision when
the group as a whole fails to agree.
E.

2000—Millennium Development Goals

Passing the Millennium Declaration and establishing the Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”) were watershed moments in development history. Rather than language about cooperation, the largest
gathering of heads of state to date171 agreed to a limited set of time-bound
169

DODDS ET AL., supra note 71, at 8 (“In 2007, for the first time in its short history, the
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goals with the “overarching vision of cutting the amount of extreme poverty worldwide in half by 2015.”172 The eight goals were subsequently
broken down into 21 targets and 60 indicators.
John McArthur, one-time Manager and Deputy Director of the UN
Millennium Project, explained the organization of the MDG implementing
mechanism as follows:
No single individual or organization is responsible for
achieving the MDGs. Instead, countless public, private, and
nonprofit actors—working together and independently, in
developed and developing countries—have furthered the
goals.173
In 2002, UNSG Kofi Annan and the administrator of the UN
Development Project asked Jeffrey Sachs to launch the UN Millennium
Project.174 He did so, bringing together hundreds of experts from around
the world in business, academia, government, and civil society.175 Some
of those same civil society leaders were encouraged “to hold their governments accountable for meeting the goals.”176 While the UN had and has
no power to enforce the MDGs, a groundswell of calls for accountability
from the domestic electorate was considered a good “soft” option—and
perhaps a more effective one.177
One situation in which this strategy would be perhaps more effective is in places like the United States, where certain international
cooperation complications affected the State’s involvement in the MDG
process. The United States was “hesitant to embrace the MDG agenda,”
largely because President George W. Bush considered the goals “UNdictated aid quotas.”178 The struggle between the US and the UN over the
war in Iraq introduced a further complication in the MDG process.179
While the Millennium Declaration recognized existing human
rights legal obligations,180 and many of the MDGs were based on human
172
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rights norms and obligations such as the rights to food, gender equality,
health, education, water and sanitation, and housing, the MDGs themselves were relatively silent on human rights.181 Many commentators at
the OWGs considered this silence a shortcoming. However, there are very
good reasons not to explicitly name human rights obligations within the
declarations on the MDGs and SDGs.182 For example, a State that is not a
party to a human rights treaty likely would not want obligations contained in that treaty to be applied to it under any circumstance. Because
not all States have ratified all IHR instruments, including references to
specific rights and instruments likely would be a political mistake.
Nonetheless, those in the IHR realm have offered useful critiques
of the MDGs. First, while the MDGs sufficiently addressed economic, social,
and cultural rights, they generally “neglect[ed] civil and political rights
and issues such as political participation, personal security and access to
justice.”183 While some civil and political rights indicators were included
in the MDGs, e.g., the proportion of parliamentary seats held by women,
many others were excluded.184 The UN Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor also demonstrated that the failure to establish legal
frameworks and effective, accountable institutions that enforce rules and
procedures can be key factors in a country’s failure to meet the MDGs.185
A second critique was the failure of the MDGs to sufficiently
address inequality. For example, there are many ways to reduce maternal
mortality by two-thirds. Depending on the population, it may be possible
to do so by completely eliminating maternal mortality from the richest
ranks of society while allowing it to remain rampant among the most vulnerable. But that strategy is not aligned with human rights standards.
Rather, it is discriminatory.
A third critique relates to quality versus quantity. The MDGs are
phrased in terms of access to services, e.g., primary education for all. A
strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development.”).
181
Stephen P. Marks, Prospects for Human Rights in the Post-2015 Development Agenda,
in VIENNA +20: ADVANCING THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACHIEVEMENTS,
CHALLENGES, AND PERSPECTIVES 20 YEARS AFTER THE WORLD CONFERENCE, (Julia
Kozma, Anna Müller-Funk, and Manfred Nowak eds., 2015).
182
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183
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purely quantitative measure fails to recognize or assure any particular
quality of the services provided. Under existing international human rights
norms, however, States who are parties to the ICESCR are obligated to
ensure that public services are not just available but also of sufficient
quality. The sole MDG indicator meant to address the quality of education
offered merely measures the “literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds, men and
women.”186 That falls far short of the ICESCR standard asserting that
the “form and substance of education, including curricula and teaching
methods, have to be acceptable (e.g., relevant, culturally appropriate, and
of good quality).”187
A related and final critique concerns the teleological nature of the
goals. Professor Roy S. Lee observed that it was a quite serious failure that
the MDGs specify goals but do not dictate guidelines for achieving them.188
Housing is one clear example. Craig Mokhiber, Chief of the Development
& Economic & Social Issues Branch of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”), repeatedly referred to situations
in which countries reduced the number of people living in urban slums
by forcefully evicting them and sending them out of their cities.189 Because the MDG indicator is the proportion of urban population living in
slums,190 violations of the right to housing191 and right to be free from
forced evictions192—again, where countries have ratified the relevant
treaties—was charted as a net gain in MDG terms. The successes and
failures of the MDGs thus provide both positive and negative guidance
for the substantive and procedural aspects of the SDGs and the HLPF.
F.

2002—Rio+10

The ten-year review of Rio was held in Johannesburg in 2002. It
was at this conference, the “World Summit on Sustainable Development”
or “WSSD,” that Member States adopted the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (“JPoI”) in order to “reinvigorate the global commitment to
186
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sustainable development.”193 The JPoI outlines the roles of the UNGA,
ECOSOC, and the CSD in promoting sustainable development.194
Reinvigoration was thought necessary because many Member
States had become dissatisfied with the CSD.195 Generally, those states
felt the CSD undertook too much negotiation on too many issues and did
not include all of the relevant and necessary actors in those discussions.196
As a result of both of these concerns, the JPoI attempted to structure the
CSD’s deliberations. The JPoI urged more direct and substantive involvement of international organizations, businesses, and other stakeholders—including Major Groups—in the CSD’s deliberations.197 It also
recommended limiting the negotiating sessions of the CSD to every two
years198 and limiting the number of topics discussed at each session.199 At
the next meeting of the CSD, the Commission adopted a multi-year work
plan in line with the JPoI’s recommendations.200
This rigid structuring of the CSD schedule of work soon displayed
its drawbacks. Topics emerged in the real world that were not on the
schedule and therefore could not be raised in CSD sessions. Eventually,
“[m]ost Member States, United Nations system organizations and major
groups” came to recognize that the CSD was unable to address “critical
contemporary challenges and new and emerging issues.”201
As a result of the concern about having the right stakeholders in
the right discussions, the JPoI suggested that the CSD increase its emphasis on promoting and facilitating partnerships across governments,
international organizations, businesses, and other stakeholders.202 These
multi-stakeholder partnerships became known as “Type II Partnerships.”203
193
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As opposed to “Type I Partnerships,” consisting of treaties and other
documents and agreements negotiated by States,204 Type II Partnerships
were new types of voluntary, “solution-oriented partnerships that may
include non-government organizations, willing governments and other
stakeholders.”205 Because the partnerships would include significant local
representation, they were envisioned to be able to act more quickly and
efficiently to affect local issues than top-down international governance.
By the end of the WSSD, approximately 280 such partnerships had been
announced.206
Developing countries were critical of Type II partnerships from the
very beginning for two main reasons. First, they were skeptical of imbalances in power that may arise in these relationships.207 Rather than abide
by obligations under the UN Right to Development and other international instruments, the imbalances in power within each Type II partnership might create new agreements in which those States with the ability
to pay get better deals.208 Similarly, many States were concerned that the
diverse nature of these multi-stakeholder partnerships would be hard to
police, which may be used to deflect accountability from international institutions meant to monitor development, e.g., the UN and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development.209
The critiques of Type-II partnerships are generally considered to
be accurate, but the benefits have also been realized. According to a leading authority on Type-II partnerships, “extensive reporting and monitoring
mechanisms” have sprung up to address the shortcomings noted above, and
the partnerships are considered to have more legitimacy than their purely
204
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governmental counterparts.210 So while the WSSD was bad for the CSD,
it was good for ushering in a new era of public-private partnerships that
have become one of the standard modes of operating for global environmental governance.211 Of course, it is also true that these partnerships have
not made enough headway on sustainability quickly enough to stave off
the current crisis.
G.

2012—Rio+20

Rio+20 was the 2012 20-year follow-up to the Earth Summit. The
key outcome document was titled The Future We Want, which represented
a recommitment to and updating of the issues that arose out of all of the
summits and declarations described above and many, many more.212 Most
importantly, it set in motion the OWG process to create SDGs213 and
created the High-Level Political Forum to replace the CSD.214
1.

Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals

The OWG on SDGs was where I had my main interaction with the
UN sustainable development processes. The OWG is a yearlong stocktaking exercise that was meant to feed information from all stakeholders
to States.215 At the end of the stocktaking exercise, States would then
decide what areas the SDGs should encompass and what specific goals,
targets, and indicators they should contain.216
The MG/OP system was used for the process. I was on a number
of steering committees that selected individuals come from around the
world to present at the OWGs, including speakers on global partnerships, global governance, rule of law, and human rights. Throughout the
process, other representatives of civil society and I were able to make
interventions and suggest ways in which processes could be aligned with
existing standards and norms, as well as ways in which existing mechanisms might provide insight into the SDG process. The feedback loop was
210
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surprisingly strong; sometimes a suggested change in process would be
implemented by the very next OWG.
The OWG process ended on July 19, 2014. The Report of the OWG
was finalized and published on August 12, 2014.217 A draft resolution
adopting the OWG Report “as the basis for integrating sustainable development goals in the post-2015 development agenda” was submitted to
the UNGA on September 8, 2014.218 The SDGs, if adopted as the basis for
the UN’s post-2015 development agenda, would then be administered by
the HLPF.
2.

HLPF

The HLPF was created by the General Assembly in The Future
We Want and was designed explicitly to replace the CSD.219 As such, the
HLPF was mandated to build “on the strengths, experiences, resources
and inclusive participation modalities” of the CSD.220 Delegates mandated
that the HLPF “shall follow up on the implementation of sustainable
development,”221 and that it “should” do so in a cost-effective manner.222
The Future We Want left the “format and organizational aspects”
of the HLPF to be decided at a later date by an intergovernmental negotiation process under the General Assembly.223 Those aspects were decided
in UNGA Resolution 67/290 of August 2013.224 Between 67/290 and The
Future We Want, the HLPF is mandated to:
•
•

217

Provide high-level political leadership and guidance
for sustainable development while avoiding overlap
and duplication;
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Implement . . . a focused, dynamic agenda that can
also consider emerging challenges;
Enhance integration and coherence of the three
dimensions of sustainable development within the
UN system, across global governance institutions
more broadly, and at all levels of decision-making;
While retaining the intergovernmental nature of
the Forum, allow a variety of modes of participation by representatives of major groups and other
relevant stakeholders;
Follow up and review progress in the implementation of sustainable development commitments of all
the major United Nations conferences and summits
in the economic, social and environmental fields, as
well as the respective means of implementation;
Strengthen the science-policy interface by examining
documentation, bringing together dispersed information and assessments, including in the form of a
global sustainable development report.225

Some of the problems with the CSD were immediately remedied by
67/290. Whereas the CSD lost legitimacy because high-level political
figures stopped showing up, Heads of State are required to be involved
in the HLPF, at least once every four years.226 But convening the HLPF
only once per year and only requiring Heads of State to be present once
every four years—for two days227—is not likely to remedy the CSD’s
inability to deal with new and emerging issues in an efficient and legitimate way. When problems arise, the HLPF cannot wait nine months to
address them.
The HLPF also currently includes no enforcement mechanism.228
It is simply not envisioned that the HLPF would ever do anything like
enforce sustainable development obligations. While there were numerous
calls for the inclusion of an accountability framework within the SDG
declaration, virtually no proposals are being taken seriously.229
225
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To be fair, it is worth noting that the UN, known far and wide for
its unparalleled bureaucracy, occasionally does show glimmers of agility.
UN DESA, “the Secretariat entity responsible for the development pillar
of the United Nations,”230 has been very proactive about institutional learning. Since June 2013, DESA has commissioned three papers on ensuring
the effectiveness of the HLPF.231
In the first, two scholars from the Global Policy Forum, Barbara
Adams and Lou Pingeot, offer 19 specific recommendations to “make the
Major Groups more inclusive and effective.”232 They comprise structural,
technical, and financial improvements with the aim of improving “both
the quantity and quality of the inputs that Major Groups and other stakeholders can provide” within the HLPF process.233 Adams and Pingeot
suggested better and more structured MG governance, the creation of
new MGs, better funding to facilitate face-to-face interaction, better administrative support, and a host of other ideal improvements.234 Given the
successes and the failures of the CSD’s multi-stakeholder dialogues, all
of Adams and Pingeot’s suggestions would markedly improve the organization of the MG system.
Of course, the multi-stakeholder dialogues had limits. Limits on
interventions and strong leadership to enforce those limits arose as an
issue in front of the OWG.235 There is a light at the end of all microphones
that indicates when a speaker’s time has run out. At many OWG sessions, delegates read long statements that exhausted their allotted time
by many minutes.
In the beginning of the OWGs, the OWG Co-chairs, Ambassador
Korosi from Hungary and Ambassador Kamau from Kenya, were soft
on those who exhausted their time.236 Toward the end of the OWGs, the
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Co-chairs took a firmer stance on time management. The Co-chairs
interrupted the delegates by saying, “You may wish to wrap up your
intervention.” Delegates displayed different levels of acceptance, but the
enforcement was appreciated by almost everyone—especially since the
statements being read were all posted online anyway.
In the second paper on the HLPF, Steven Bernstein builds on the
work of Abbott and Snidal in arguing that the HLPF’s primary mode of
operating should be as an Orchestrator.237 As an Orchestrator, the HLPF’s
primary function would not be to enforce state compliance with SDGs,
but to “provide leadership, guidance, knowledge, and political authority”
to other entities “to build coherence and integration” in various spheres of
political action.238 An example already seen was when the Millennium
Project encouraged and supported civil society leaders to hold their governments accountable.
In this vein, Professor Beth Simmons’s study of human rights
treaty obligations elucidates three ways in particular that human rights
treaties have had some normative impact on domestic policies. First,
from the most elite perspective, discussion of treaty ratification affects
the agenda negotiated by the elite of a country because they are forced to
answer the question, “Should we ratify this thing?”239 Once they have
that discussion, the elite discourse is permanently altered with virtually
no popular input.240
Second, once a treaty has been ratified, compliance may be able
to be enforced without reverting to an international mechanism at all.
Depending on the structure of the domestic legal regime, enforcement
proceedings may be able to be brought in domestic courts.241 South Africa
represents one type of domestication of international obligations through
its constitutional mandate that, when interpreting the South African Bill
of Rights, courts must look to international law and may look to foreign
law.242 As a result of this Constitutional Mandate, a South African court
referred to the ICESCR in Grootboom even though South Africa was not
other’s ideas, we should try very hard to keep our interventions within the time limits.” Div.
for Sustainable Dev., Seventh Meeting, Open Working Group on Sustainable Development
Goals, Eighth Session (Feb. 6, 2014), http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page
=view&nr=872&type=12&menu=1807&template=1042&play=452, archived at http://perma
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a signatory to that treaty.243 “Monist” or partially monist countries such
as the Dominican Republic244 represent another avenue-constitutionalizing international obligations—which allows international obligations
to immediately take effect and enjoy supremacy over sub-constitutional
domestic legislation.
Third, commitments to a human rights treaty can perform a legitimating function for popular groups that mobilize in support of compliance.245 Simmons found this effect was greatest “in countries that are
neither stable democracies (where most rights are already protected and
the motive to mobilize is relatively low) nor stable autocracies (where the
likelihood of successful mobilization is low if the rights the treaty addresses
are seen in any way as challenging status quo governing arrangements).”246
These three avenues illustrate that the HLPF need not intervene directly
or have direct enforcement power in order to have some normative impact
on domestic policies and legislation. But, barring some extraordinary popular uprising on climate change or some uncharacteristically celeritous
domestic litigation, Simmons’s normative impacts are simply not likely to
avert a crisis nor solve the one that we are in.
The third paper is not yet published, but was discussed at OWG8.
In it, Jan-Gustav Stradeanas, who has been involved in global development discussions since the Stockholm Conference of 1972, analyzes
ambiguities in Modalities of Participation in the HLPF. He argues that
there is currently significant room for negotiation of permitted modalities
of stakeholder participation in the HLPF due to ambiguities in the text
of UNGA Resolution 67/290. But, he asserts, decisions made by governments in the next six months to two years will likely foreclose some
avenues of potential participation unless concerted advocacy convinces
States that they should leave those avenues open.
II.

ORGANIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION THEORY

At heart, the HLPF is only an organization within the large and
complex UN organization.247 According to sociologists of organizations,
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all organizations are fundamentally “engaged in a search for what is
valuable,”248 i.e., that which helps the organization achieve its goals. The
HLPF’s main goal is to help the planet meet “the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs.”249 So, with regard to sustainable development, the HLPF is engaged in a search for that which allows present and future needs to be met.
Organizations are designed to find value.250 But in crisis situations,
what is valuable for organizational success changes. And when what is
valuable for success changes, some organizations thrive while others
wither. Organizational design can be the difference between the two,
with some design features facilitating recognition of new forms of value
better than others.
A.

Heterarchies Excel at Recognizing Value in Crisis Situations

In January 2011, UNSG Ban Ki-moon addressed the World Economic Forum in Davos. He spoke to those who have benefited from the
world as it is and told them the world needs to change:
We need a revolution. Revolutionary thinking. Revolutionary action.
A free market revolution for global sustainability.
It is easy to mouth the words “sustainable development”,
but to make it happen we have to be prepared to make
major changes—in our lifestyles, our economic models, our
social organization, and our political life.251
In organizational terms, revolution is based on successful innovation. And innovation is based on searching, often without knowing what
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one is searching for.252 Once one finds that thing, one must be able to
recognize it for what it is: a revolutionary innovation.
1.

Uncertainty Is the Essence of Crisis, and Our World Is
Becoming More Uncertain by the Day

In a crisis, the future is uncertain. If one had known the solution
in advance, the crisis would have been averted. And if one knew the solution right away, the crisis would already be over. But what is valuable for
getting out of a crisis and what will be valuable on the other side of the
crisis is unknown prior to the crisis. That is, what is valuable in those
instances is uncertain.
There are multiple forms of uncertainty that affect international
organizations. The three main types are uncertainty about the state of
the world, other actors’ preferences, and other actors’ behavior.253 The
greater the overall uncertainty, the less predictable the value of an organizational resource will be.
As for the first two types of uncertainty, it was previously thought
that the “environmental area is plagued by enormous uncertainty (most
of it scientific) about the state of the world and much less uncertainty
about [State actor] preferences.”254 But since at least December 2010,
State preferences have become significantly less certain. When States
undergo revolution and regime change, their preferences change. The
Arab Spring brought with it a great tide of regime change that continues
to this day.255 As a result, State actor preferences are more uncertain now
than they have been in decades.
Actor behavior has also become much less certain in recent years.
As Jeffrey Sachs pointed out in a recent op-ed, the US, the EU, NATO,
252
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and now Russia violate international law—an element of liberal peace—
in what seems like a return to great power politics.256 As a result, notwithstanding Simmons’s research above, when a State signs a treaty, it
is becoming less certain that the State will abide by the terms of that
treaty.257 So it is not just regime changes that have spawned uncertainty;
even regimes that have not changed per se—and that have been
relatively stable for decades—are now setting dangerous precedents with
actions that disrupt the relative certainty that is essential to international legal arrangements.258
Meanwhile, the uncertainty about the state of the world is also
increasing. Even though there is ever-greater consensus that climate
change is occurring, we do not know what its effects will be. In March
2014, more than 100 governments unanimously approved a report making two assertions with “high confidence”: first, that “[u]ncertainties
about future vulnerability, exposure, and responses of interlinked human
and natural systems are large”;259 and second, particularly relevant for
the HLPF’s task, that “[r]esponding to climate-related risks involves
decision-making in a changing world, with continuing uncertainty about
the severity and timing of climate-change impacts and with limits to the
effectiveness of adaptation.”260
From a cooperation perspective, an uncertainty’s effect will vary
based on its context. Uncertainty about another actor’s behavior, e.g.,
256
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whether it will abide by treaty obligations, may make cooperation more
difficult, while uncertainty about the state of the world may make cooperation easier.261 For example, if no one knows how much oil is under
a piece of land, negotiations about ownership of that land may be much
less contentious than if everyone is certain that the land is oil-rich. From
an organizational design perspective, however, greater uncertainty
necessitates greater organizational adaptability. That is so because the
organization will need to be effective in its mission no matter which
States hold global power, no matter what agendas those States hold, and
no matter what unforeseen events arise.
2.

Heterarchies Are Maximally Adaptable Because They
Facilitate Taking on New Organizational Forms to Deal
with New Problems

David Stark is a sociologist at Columbia University who has been
studying organizations in crisis for his entire career. Most of his work
focuses on business entities, but because his analysis operates at the pure
organizational theory level, it is equally applicable to IOs. The thesis of
his most recent book, The Sense of Dissonance, addresses qualities that
make organizations effective in crisis situations, and is therefore quoted
here at length:
When coping with [situations of great uncertainty], where
[disruptive events] can be anticipated in general but are
unpredictable in their specific contours, firms must be perpetually poised to pursue innovation. To do so they build
organizations that are not only capable of learning but also
capable of suspending accepted knowledge and established
procedures to redraw cognitive categories and reconfigure
relational boundaries—both at the level of the products
261
Koremenos et al., supra note 253, at 778. An additional type of uncertainty not mentioned here is textual uncertainty, i.e., vagueness of the documents around which cooperation centers. See Marc Pallemaerts, International Environmental Law from Stockholm
to Rio: Back to the Future?, 1 REV. OF EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 254, 261 (1992)
(“It is not surprising that such a concept [as sustainable development] has received
widespread support from leaders of the North and South alike, environmental and Third
World movements, international bureaucrats and enlightened managers of financial and
economic institutions and structures in both capitalist and socialist countries. This is
explained by the artful vagueness which the new paradigm of ‘sustainable development’
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and services produced by the firm and at the level of the
working practices and production processes within the firm.
These organizations innovate in ways that allow them to
recognize, redefine, recombine, and redeploy resources for
further innovation. That is, alongside technological innovation, they also engage in organizational innovation by
creating organizational forms that allow for easy reconfiguration and hence minimize the costs of reorganization. Such
capacities for organizational innovation go beyond the discovery of new means to carry out existing functions more
effectively and efficiently. Under conditions of radical uncertainty, organizations that simply improve their adaptive
fit to the current environment risk sacrificing adaptability
in subsequent dislocations.262
The HLPF will be maximally adaptable if it is organized as a
heterarchy. When shifts in State power or State behavior—or a global
environmental event—occur, the HLPF must be able to “recognize, redefine, recombine, and redeploy resources” in order to accommodate those
changes and continue to operate as an effective Orchestrator.
Due to the massive amount of environmental and political uncertainty, the HLPF will need to be maximally adaptable in order to be
an effective Orchestrator of sustainable development governance. A project involving Intermediaries from the business world may require different sorts of orchestration than a project involving Intermediaries from
the NGO world or the intergovernmental organization (“IGO”) world. An
effective Orchestrator must be able to recognize new problems and design new orchestration solutions—which may mean implementing new
organizational design features.
Abbott et al., the founders of the orchestration movement, assert
that governance actors like the HLPF are more likely to orchestrate when
their “organizational structure and culture encourage . . . entrepreneurship.”263 Heterarchies encourage entrepreneurship because they foster
creative friction between competing evaluative structures. That creative
friction results in the anticipation and recognition of new problems,264
and out of new problems come new solutions. Whether the HLPF has the
262
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adaptive flexibility to operate as a heterarchical Orchestrator rests in
large part on the amount of authority States delegate to the HLPF.
B.

States Would Need to Delegate Significant Design Authority to
the HLPF in Order to Allow it to Act Heterarchically

To reiterate: heterarchies reorganize themselves in order to suit
the needs and organizational structures of specific projects. That ability
to reorganize makes heterarchies effective Orchestrators, because working with different Intermediaries requires the Orchestrator to figure out
how it can best fit into the existing organizational framework of the
Intermediary. Thus, the greater the HLPF’s authority to reorganize itself
when confronted with a new orchestration problem, the greater the
likelihood the HLPF will be a successful Orchestrator.
Two IO scholars, Tana Johnson and Johannes Urpelainen, recently developed a theory about how much organizational design discretion States delegate to “international bureaucrats in the design of
new IGOs.”265 They contend that even though powerful States may disagree with a bureaucrat’s design preferences, those States may nonetheless grant the bureaucrat substantial leeway in the organizational
design of a new institution. The States do so largely because they rely on
bureaucrats’ expertise.
Two factors emerge as principal drivers of whether or not States
delegate design authority: 1) State capability, with particular regard
to uncertainty and cost of designing the institution; and 2) the salience
of a particular matter, in particular, “an issue’s proximity to state
survival.”266 Given the uncertainty noted above, that element is likely
satisfied, for no one State could have the capability and capacity to
monitor global political and environmental uncertainty267—nor would a
State want that mandate. The primary question will be whether States
265
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find the issue proximate enough to their fundamental interests that they
refuse to delegate it. If they do, there is little that can be done—within
the current system of transnational governance.
III.

SOME MORE EXTREME OPTIONS

But there is another option: change the system. Stewart Patrick
claims that the future will not see “the renovation or the construction of
a glistening new international [governance] architecture.”268 But maybe
Patrick is only correct up until the widespread recognition of imminent
danger. Maybe once people realize that their corner of the Earth is literally at risk of not being able to sustain life much longer, there will be
some popular outcry.
At that point, there may be another option. That option is to
create a body that does not orchestrate—that does not act through
Intermediaries—but that takes direct decisions and can enforce those
decisions with whatever power is available. The suggestion requires
Chapter VII-esque authority to act on the environment.269
Pollution may fall under Chapter VII as it is written. The logic of
Chapter VII of the UN Charter is that a global body is rightly vested
with the power to take collective action against individual States that
violate the sovereignty of another State by threatening peace, breaching
the peace, or otherwise acting aggressively. The science behind a physical
breach of the peace is simple: if State A launches a missile against State B
without UN approval, there is no question that it is breaching the peace,
and it is therefore susceptible to Chapter VII enforcement mechanisms
to restore peace. Blue helmets may well follow.
Now, another hypothetical. If State A were to pollute the entire atmosphere surrounding a part of State B and, as a result, an environmental event occurred in that part of State B that killed thousands of
people, should blue helmets not follow to stop State A from continuing to
pollute? One major issue, of course, is the causality between pollution
and environmental events; even the IPCC report does not go into detail
268
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about how a specific polluter might be responsible for specific events. But
fitting environmental damage into Chapter VII may be easier than it first
appears. After Libya, however, it has been and will be extremely difficult
to pass a Chapter VII resolution through the Security Council—even for
those States disrupting international peace by more conventional methods.
Another option is to rethink the existing structures of transnational
governance in order to accommodate these new threats to individual and
international peace that simply did not exist in their current magnitude
when the UN was first formed.270 UN reform has been on the table for
some time, and D/D Divides that have existed throughout development
discussion for decades are still stalling meaningful action within the current structure. So now may be a good time to change the structure—while
we still have a globe to govern.
CONCLUSION
The world is in a state of dual crisis. The environment is being
irreparably damaged, yet global governance cannot muster the strength
to stop it. Thus, the crisis is both environmental and political.
Sustainable development initiatives that have not been successful
can teach us many things. A development obligation within a regional or
international cooperation agreement—without more—does not guarantee
implementation. CBDR is now recognized by States and stakeholders
alike as the only equitable way to assign obligations to mitigate or reverse
climate change and other environmental degradation. Self-governance
is sufficient only up to a point. Broad stakeholder participation benefits
development initiatives, but not enough to make a meaningful difference
in real world results. High-level diplomats must remain involved in a
mechanism that is delegated sufficient authority to be flexible and enforce its decisions.
Resolution 67/290 does not preclude the HLPF from being structured as a heterarchical Orchestrator. Structured as such, the HLPF
could incorporate many of these lessons. Its orchestration could be the
“more” required to drive development obligations. It could follow the
principle of CBDR. It could ensure that MGs are sufficiently governed.
It could allow for broad stakeholder participation, which would all but
ensure creative friction between different evaluative structures. And if
some form/bureau/secretariat of the HLPF met much more often than
67/290 asserts, it could remain agile and adaptable.
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But it lacks enforcement power. That may be a critical downfall.
If the SDGs are to make a difference as quickly as scientists say they
need to, broad popular support for international obligations likely will
not be enough. It will require top-down enforcement, either under the
current Chapter VII or in some new formation.
World War II shocked the world enough to catalyze the creation
of the UN, the Security Council, and Chapter VII authority to violate a
State’s sovereignty. If we wait for the environmental crisis to shock us to
that extent, it will be too late. Sovereignty will be of little use when there
are no more people around to exercise it.

